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Major MX. Tucker, Officer Commanding 
23 Canadian Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers 
J n September 1944 the 23rd Canadian Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, was 
attached to 43rd (Wessex) Division of British 
30 Corps. It was to support that division's 
proposed assault across the Rhine to relieve 
1st British Airborne Division in the Arnhem 
bridgehead. 
On the morning of 25 September, Major 
M.L. Tucker, the officer commanding the 23rd 
Field Company, was called to an Orders Group. 
The decision to evacuate the remaining 
airborne troops had been made and Major 
Tucker was told the Canadians should use 
their stormboatsfor the operation. They were 
given no additional resources for carrying, off-
loading Or assisting the men evacuated, 
presumably because no one believed that large 
numbers of men could be rescued. Major 
Tucker and Lieutenant R.S. Kennedy went 
forward to recce the area and subsequently 
Lieutenant Kennedy and Lieutenant Tate 
located two sites northeast of Driel where 
stormboats could be launched. 
Fourteen stormboats and 1 7 Evinrude 
outboard motors were available and 10 Field 
Park Company provided 12 fitters and 
equipment repairers who proved invaluable. 
Major Tucker was told that Oosterbeek 
Church, directly across the river from the 
launching site, was the centre of the airborne 
bridgehead. The first stormboat was to be on 
the north side of the river by 2140 that night. 
Major Tucker's account of that incredible 
night was written on 30 September 1944. Memorial erected in honour of the Canadian operation 
to rescue British paratroopers near Arnhem. 
Photo by L. Copp 
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L ieutenant Kennedy was put in charge of the off-loading of vehicles and the carrying 
of stormboats to launching sites, about 500 
yards ahead. Lieutenants Martin and Cronyn 
were delegated to clear and tape routes for 
moving the stormboats from off-loading points 
to launching sites. Subsequently Lieutenant 
Martin was detailed to proceed to the far bank 
to de t e rmine the s i t ua t i on there and 
Lieutenant Cronyn was placed in charge of 
the beach on our side of the river. This beach 
had two bays, one on the western end, about 
20 yards wide, and one on the eastern end 
about 60 yards wide. The two were separated 
by a groin built out of rock and projecting 
about 30 yards out into the river. The small 
bay was used for the launching of boats and 
the wider one and the groin as operating 
bases for the craft. Lieutenant Tate was 
slated to assist Lieutenant Kennedy and to 
supervise the setting up of advance petrol 
dumps and Regimental Aid Post. 
Two flood walls blocked the path from the 
off-loading area to the launching sites. The 
first of these was about 20 feet high with 
banks sloping to about 45 degrees, the second 
one was about half the height and the slope of 
the bank was much less severe. These 
obstacles became most difficult to negotiate. 
The heavy rain softened the ground and the 
churning of men's feet as they struggled over 
with stormboats soon created a slippery mess 
which lent no footing whatsoever. Hand 
ropes were fixed, but even with these the 
going was extremely difficult. 
The first boat was launched at 2130 hours, 
but it had been badly holed when the men 
carrying slipped coming down the side of the 
floodwall and the stream of water which 
poured into it would have sunk it before it 
could have completed a crossing. The next 
boat was launched at 2145 hours and set off 
with Lieutenant Martin in command. This 
boat did not return and neither Lieutenant 
Martin nor any member of the crew has been 
seen or heard from since. Two witnesses 
report having seen it break apart and sink as 
the result of a direct mortar hit. They cannot 
be positive of this, however, as visibility was 
very bad. Corporal McLachlan captained the 
3rd boat to be launched and soon returned 
bearing the first load of Airborne troops to be 
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evacuated by us. He continued and completed 
15 trips before he was relieved by a fresh 
crew. The fourth boat, in charge of Corporal 
S.F. Smith, was launched twenty minutes 
later, at 2235 hours. This boat made its way 
safely to the bridgehead, but swamped when 
a mortar fell close by on the return voyage. 
Corporal Smith, although not a swimmer, 
floated back on his open greatcoat to the far 
side. Four of his passengers also got back, 
but all other occupants of the boat appear to 
have been lost. Succeeding boats were 
launched at intervals of about 20 minutes 
and all 14 boats were in the water by 0330 
hours. None of these boats were sunk in the 
channel, but several of them were eventually 
holed by enemy fire or submerged obstacles 
and had to be abandoned on reaching shore. 
An enemy mortar was observed firing from 
directly opposite the launch site during the 
time that the first four boats were being 
launched but was not seen afterwards, so 
that it is presumed that our troops in the 
bridgehead must have cleared it up. 
The night was intensely dark, but fires 
started by our bombers in the afternoon and 
the numerous flares sent up by the enemy 
must have revealed a great deal of our 
movement to him. These fires helped us 
greatly too, since they provided beacons by 
which our boat crews could direct their craft. 
Intermittent burst of Bren were fired across 
to mark the limits of our beach boundaries, 
but in view of the fact that the fires provided 
stationary and constant light the crews did 
not resort to observation of the incendiary 
bursts from the Brens. Heavy rain was 
accompanied by a bitter wind which made 
things most unpleasant, but the bad weather 
was probably less to the liking of the enemy 
than it was to us and most surely have 
resulted in our having had less casualties 
than should have done had the night been 
clear and fine. The rain cause the Evinrude 
motors to give endless trouble and was 
responsible for their failing altogether in many 
cases. Something must be done to protect 
the electric circuits of these motors if they are 
to be continued to be used for such purposes. 
E. & M. personnel and our own fitters worked 
ceaselessly to keep the motors in running 
order, but they could never keep up to the 
breakdowns. 
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Inscription on plaque marking the 
site of the rescue operation. 
There was a great deal of enemy fire during 
the night. Machine guns set on fixed lines 
swept the river and beaches on both sides. 
Fortunately most of the fire was high, at least 
it was on the operating site on the South side 
of the river. When daylight came the machine 
guns up on the hill above the bridgehead 
rained a murderous hail of bullets on those 
craft which were still operating, but the 
downward angle of the fire was much less 
effective than it would have been had the 
guns been in position to make more horizontal 
sweeps . Mortar and 88 mm fire fell 
everywhere. Many casualties were reported 
from the bridgehead, but on the river and on 
the South bank they were light. Three men 
were wounded in the off-loading area and one 
between there and the beach. Enemy snipers 
were also active and it was reported that 
some of the Airborne troops spotted the 
positions of two of them in crossing the river 
and proceeded to liquidate them when they 
reached the South shore. 
It was Jound impossible to keep complete 
records of the crossings made and the 
passengers carried. Paper turned to pulp in 
the driving rain. There was no point, either, 
from which a picture of what was going on 
along the whole beach could be seen and in 
many cases passengers were landed well 
outside the limits of the beach when stalled 
motors had allowed craft to stray off line. It 
was impossible to regulate the number of 
passengers carried in boats at times. Men 
panicked and stormed onto the boats, in 
some cases capsizing them. In many cases 
they had to be beaten off or threatened with 
shooting to avoid having the boats swamped. 
With the approach of dawn this condition 
became worse. They were afraid that daylight 
would force us to cease our ferrying before 
they could be rescued. The maximum lift at 
one time was 36. All of these men were 
packed into his boat by Lieutenant Kennedy 
on his last trip, the last trip made by anyone 
in this operation. The minimum lift was 6. A 
corporal operating a boat which was leaking 
They Were Just Shadows 
and Wispers in the Night 
It is 25th September 1944 the battle of 
Arnhem is still raging, but the position of 
the surrounded British and Polish Airborne 
troops on the northern Rhine bank has 
become untenable. 
Then the orderfor their evacuation across 
the river is given. In that rainy night 
hundreds of soldiers come in small parties 
to the river forelands, between the 
farmhouse and the Old Church . . . and 
wait to be rescued. Under heavy German 
fire from the Westerbouwing, British (260 
and 553Fd Coys) and Canadian (20 and 
23Fd Coy) Engineers make dozens of 
trips in their small boats from this bank. In 
one night, supported by other units, they 
manage to rescue 2,400 Airborne troops. 
At the time the rescued had hardly seen 
their savers, so they have never been 
able to thank them. This monument has 
been erected to express their gratitude. 
(15th September 1989) 
badly decided he could make one more trip 
and bring off a few men before his craft went 
down. It sunk as he approached the South 
shore, but fortunately the water was shallow 
at this point and they were all able to wade 
a s h o r e safely. I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t 
approximately 150 boatloads were brought 
back by the s tormboat crews and tha t 
approximately the average load carried was 
about 16 passengers. Thus approximately 
2400 to 2500 troops were brought off. 
No forward facilities were provided for the 
care of wounded, beyond what was available 
in the FAP's set up by 260 Field Company and 
this Company. Many of the rescued men were 
wounded and our own RAP dressed 69 
stretcher cases as well as attending to over 
100 walking wounded. Greatcoats and other 
clothing were used to improvise stretchers 
and were given to men who were in desperate 
need of cover from the elements. Caring for 
all these casualties proved a great drain on 
the man power of the Company and prevented 
adequate reliefs for the boat carrying parties 
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and boat crews. RAMC facilities were available 
in the rear of our off-loading area, but these 
were only designed to cope with casualties 
which it was expected might arise from within 
the personnel of the two field companies 
employed in the operation. 
The work of all personnel employed in this 
operation was of a very high standard, but 
there were those who rose beyond that level. 
Lieutenant Kennedy, in addition to making a 
recce, planning the operation and supervising 
the off-loading and delivering the stormboats 
to the launching sites, took command of a 
boat when these tasks were completed and 
brought off 125 men from the bridgehead 
under very trying conditions which prevailed 
with the advent of daylight. Corporal Robinson 
did a tremendous nights work. With his 
section he constructed a bridge by which 
access was made possible to the orchard 
which was used as our off-loading area. With 
the arrival of the bridging lorries, he took 
charge of a party and was responsible for the 
safe and prompt delivery of many stormboats 
to the launching sites. On delivering the last 
boat, he took command of it and complete 6 
t r ips before the boat was p u t out of 
commission. All of the boat crews were 
magnificent, and only gave up their ferrying 
when their boats were no longer operable or 
else when they were exhausted and had to be 
ordered from the beach. 
Of these Lance Corporals Albright and 
Gunness and Sappers LeBouthillier and 
McCready were ou t s t and ing . H/Cap t . 
Mongeon, the R.C. Padre, came under fire for 
the first time in his career and acquitted 
himself nobly. In addition to the normal 
duties of attending wounded and bringing 
courage and cheer to the exhausted men, he 
helped with the carrying of the stormboats, 
carried petrol to the beach and seemed to 
always be present where he was most needed. 
The E & M personnel attached from the Field 
Park Company rendered excellent service in 
keeping the Evinrude motors running. 
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The casualties suffered by the Company 
in this engagement were as follows :-
Lt. J.R. Martin Missing & p resumed KIA * 
L/Cpl W.D. Ryan Missing & p resumed KIA 
Spr D.L.G. Hope Missing & presumed KIA 
Spr H.C. Magnusson Missing & presumed KIA 
Spr L.J. Roherty Missing & presumed KIA 
Spr N.A. Thompson Missing & presumed KIA 
Sgt D.E. Barnes Wounded 
Spr D.E. Francis Wounded 
Spr D.J. McCready Wounded 
Spr R.T. McKee Wounded 
Spr J .P . LeToqueux Wounded 
Killed in Action 
Commander Royal Engineers 43 Division 
ordered cessation of operations at 0545 hours 
when it became evident that any further 
attempts to bring off men would be suicidal 
for the boat crews. 
The Company with a t t ached t roops 
repaired to the off-loading area and embussed 
for the advance harbour area at VALBURG. 
Lieutenant Asper and his party had breakfast 
ready and took care of the feeding of many of 
the returned Airborne troops in addition to 
our own personnel. 
Lieutenant Cronyn was left behind in the 
off-loading area to pick up and bring in any 
stragglers who might come in after the main 
body had moved off. He remained there until 
1030 hours, but none of the above reported 
missing came in and there was little chance of 
anyone showing up until darkness fell again. 
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